Introduction
Since Lewis's (1969) and Aumann's (1976) pioneering contributions, the concepts of common knowledge and common belief have been discussed extensively in the literature, both syntactically and semantically 1 . At the individual level the difference between knowledge and belief is usually identified with the presence or absence of the Truth Axiom ( i A → A), which is interpreted as "if individual i believes that A, then A is true". In such a case the individual is often said to know that A (thus it is possible for an individual to believe a false proposition but she cannot know a false proposition). Going to the interpersonal level, the literature then distinguishes between common knowledge and common belief on the basis of whether or not the Truth Axiom is postulated at the individual level. However, while at the individual level the Truth Axiom captures merely a relationship between the individuals' beliefs and the external world, at the interpersonal level it has very strong implications. For example, the following is a consequence of the Truth Axiom: i j A → i A, that is, if individual i believes that individual j believes that A, then individual i herself believes that A. Thus, in contrast to other axioms, the Truth Axiom does not merely reflect individual agents' "logic of belief". (The reason why the Truth Axiom is much stronger in an interpersonal context than appears at first glance is that it amounts to assuming that agreement of any individual's belief with the truth is common knowledge). Given its logical force, it is not surprising to find that it has strong implications for the logic of common knowledge. In particular, if each individual's beliefs satisfy the strongest logic of knowledge (namely S5 or KT5), the associated common knowledge operator satisfies this logic too. Such is not the case for belief: bereft of the Truth Axiom, even the strongest logic for individual belief (KD45) is insufficient to ensure the satisfaction of the "Negative Introspection" axiom for common belief: ¬ * A → * ¬ * A (where * denotes the common belief operator). That is to say, it can happen that neither is A commonly believed nor is it common belief that A is not commonly believed. Indeed the Negative Introspection axiom for common belief implies restrictions on individual beliefs of an intersubjective nature. In this paper we consider a variety of intersubjective compatibility restrictions on the beliefs of the individuals and study their relationship. We also provide a characterization of Negative Introspection for common belief.
2 The basic system K * n
We consider a multimodal system with n + 1 operators 1 , 2 , ..., n , * where, for i = 1, ..., n, the interpretation of i A is "individual i believes that A", while * A is interpreted as "it is common belief that A". The basic system K * n is given by a suitable axiomatization of Propositional Calculus together with the following axiom schemata and rules of inference:
MP (modus ponens)
A, A→B B We now turn to the semantics. A standard model is a tuple M = W, R 1 , ..., R n , R * , V where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R 1 , ..., R n , R * are binary accessibility relations on W and V is a valuation, that is, a function that associates with every atomic proposition p the set of possible worlds where p is true. The valuation is extended to the set of formulas in the usual way; we denote the fact that formula A is true at world w in model M by M, w |= A. Thus, in particular, for i = 1, ..., n, M, w |= i A if and only if M, w ′ |= A for all w ′ such that wR i w ′ . Similarly, M, w |= * A if and only if M, w ′ |= A for all w ′ such that wR * w ′ . The following result is well-known (cf., for example, Bonanno, 1996) .
RN (necessitation)
A
Theorem 1
The system K * n is sound and complete with respect to the class of standard models where R * is the transitive closure of R 1 ∪ ... ∪ R n . 2 A standard model where R * is the transitive closure of R 1 ∪...∪R n will be called a CB-model.
We will investigate extensions of K * n obtained by adding one or more of the following axioms for individual beliefs:
In the next section we list some theorems and derived rules of inference for K * n which will be used later.
3 Some properties of K * n For every modal operator ∈ { 1 , ..., n , * } we write ♦ for ¬ ¬ (thus, for example, ♦ i A stands for ¬ i ¬A). Furthermore, PL stands for "Propositional Logic". It is well-known (see, for example, Chellas, 1984, Lismont and Mongin, 1994 ) that K * n has the following theorems and rules of inference: RK
(apply RN to the hypothesis, then use CB3 and MP)
(apply R1CB to the hypothesis then use PL)
Proofs of the following lemma and corollary are given in the Appendix.
Lemma 2
The following is provable in K * n :
The following is provable in K * n + 4c:
It is well-known (cf. Chellas, 1984 ) that axiom 4c is provable in K * n + 5. Hence CB5 is provable in K * n + 5.
Interpersonal compatibility of beliefs
In general, the common belief operator * does not inherit all the properties of the individuals' belief operators. Consider, for example, the counterpart for common belief of axiom 5 for individual beliefs:
Now, 5 * is not provable in the system obtained by adding D, 4 and 5 to K * n , which will be denoted by K * n + D45 (a fortiori it is not provable in a weaker system such as K * n + 5). This is shown in the following example.
Example 1 Consider the following CB-model:
Let p be an atomic proposition which is true at b and false at a. Then the formula (¬ * p → * ¬ * p), which is an instance of 5 * , is false at a. Since the system K * n + D45 is sound with respect to the class of CB-models where R i is serial, transitive and euclidean (i = 1, ..., n) and this model satisfies these properties, it follows that 5 * is not provable in K * n + D45.
It follows from Example 1 that axiom 5 * must involve further restrictions on the beliefs of the individuals which presumably are intersubjective in nature. In this section we consider various requirements of intersubjective compatibility of beliefs and study their relationship.
The following axioms capture interpersonal restrictions of various strength on the beliefs of the individuals. Remark 2 T, the Truth Axiom for individuals beliefs, plays a much stronger role in multiagent contexts than in single-agent ones. For a single individual the Truth Axiom captures merely a relationship between her beliefs and the external world; at the interpersonal level, on the other hand, it implies strong intersubjective compatibility of beliefs. Indeed, all of the above axioms (C, TN, TP, IN, IP, SW and T CB ) are provable in K * n + T. The reason why the Truth Axiom has strong implications in an interpersonal context is that it amounts to assuming that agreement of any individual's beliefs with the truth is commonly believed.
The following theorem establishes the relationship between the first five axioms, namely C, TN, TP, IN and IP.
Theorem 4
Proof. The proof of (i) is as follows. 1 .
The proof of (iii) is as follows:
By Theorem 4, Compatibility (axiom C) has strong implications for the truth of intersubjective beliefs (TP and TN) ; moreover, it crucially involves some form of intersubjective agreement (IP). However, as the following example shows, intersubjective truth alone (TP and TN) fails to imply any intersubjective agreement (IP or IN) and therefore fails to imply C.
Example 2 Consider the following model:
Thus R * (the transitive closure of R 1 ∪ R 2 ) is the universal relation. Let p be an atomic proposition which is true at a and false at b. Then at a all of the following are true 1 2 p, ♦ 1 2 p, ¬ 1 p, 1 ¬p, 2 p, thus falsifying IN, IP, and C. On the other hand, both TP and TN are true at every world. 3 Similarly, the following example shows that intersubjective agreement (IP and IN) does not imply intersubjective truth (TP and TN) nor does it imply compatibility (C). W = {a, b, c}, R 1 = {(a, a), (b, a), (c, c)}, R 2 = {(a, a), (b, c), (c, c) }. Thus R * = {(a, a), (b, a), (b, c), (c, c) 4 We now turn to the relationship between SW and T CB .
Example 3 Let
Theorem 5
The next theorem relates T CB to 5 * .
Theorem 6
Proof. The proof of (i) is as follows:
3 This is a consequence of the following fact, which is proved in the appendix. Axioms TN and TP are valid in the class of CB-models where, ∀i, j ∈ N, ∀w, w ′ , w ′′ ∈ W , (1) Ri is serial and (2) if wRiw ′ and w ′ Rjw ′′ then wR j w ′′ . The model of the above example satifies this property. 4 This is a consequence of the following fact, which is proved in the Appendix. Axioms IN and IP are valid in the class of CB-models where, ∀i, j ∈ N, ∀w ∈ W , ∃w ′ ∈ W such that (1) wRiw ′ and (2) ∀w ′′ ∈ W, if wRiw
The model of the above example satifies this property. 1 .
(4,7,PL) Now, a repetition of steps 1-8 for every i = 1, ..., n leads to (by 8 and PL) 9.
Remark 3 Since (cf. Remark 1) K * n + 5 ⊢ 4c, it follows from (ii) of Theorem 5 that K * n + 5 + SW ⊢ T CB . Thus, by Theorem 6, K * n + 5 + SW ⊢ 5 * . Furthermore, by Theorems 5 and 6, K * n + D + 5 * ⊢ SW. It follows from Theorem 6 that K * n + D5 + SW and K * n + D5 + 5 * are the same system.
We now turn to the relationship between axioms TN, TP, IN, IP, C and the Shared Worlds axiom (SW).
Proposition 7 None of TN, TP, IN, IP and C is provable in K * n + D45 + SW (thus, a fortiori, in a weaker system such as K * n + SW).
Proof. First of all, it is straightforward to show that the system K * n + D45 + SW is sound with respect to the class of CB-models where (1) ∀i ∈ N , R i is serial, transitive and euclidean, and (2) ∀i, j ∈ N , ∀x, y, z ∈ W , if xR j y and yR * z then ∃w ∈ W such that xR i w and wR * z. The following model belongs to this class: , a), (b, c) , (c, c)}, R 3 = {(a, a), (b, b), (c, a)}; thus R * is the universal relation. Let p be an atomic proposition which is true at c and false at a and b. Then this model validates all the theorems of K * n + D45 + SW (in particular SW itself) 5 . It is easily checked that 1 2 p → 2 p (which is an instance of TN) is false at a 1 ♦ 2 p → ♦ 2 p (which is an instance of TP) is false at a 1 2 p → 1 p (which is an instance of IN) is false at a ♦ 1 2 p → ♦ 1 p (which is an instance of IP) is false at a 2 p → ¬ 3 ¬p (which is an instance of C) is false at b 5 Since R * is the universal relation, for every formula A and every world w, w |= * A if and only if A is valid (i.e. true at every world). It follows from seriality of Ri that if individual i believed that A is common belief then A is indeed commonly believed (thus T CB is valid). Hence everybody shares i's belief that A is common belief (thus SW is valid). 
